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NOTES
THE TRAGEDY OF BRIDE BURNING IN
INDIA: HOW SHOULD THE LAW ADDRESS
IT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a week of marriage, Savita Sharma's in-laws made
demands for a refrigerator, scooter, television set, and cash.'
Her mother-in-law verbally abused her, did not give her
enough food to eat or soap to bathe with, and locked up all her
clothes.2 Both her mother-in-law and her husband beat her.3
On one occasion, she overheard her mother-in-law tell a ten-
ant, "I will burn her and then give money to the police to hush
up the case."4 Savita Sharma's emotional and physical suffer-
ing at the hands of her husband and in-laws is typical of what
many young married women experience in India if their hus-
band and in-laws are dissatisfied with the amount of dowry'
that the women bring to the marriage.
Frequently, the violence escalates and results in either the
young bride's murder or in her suicide.' Sudha Jai's case is
1. See Raka Sinha, Seven Dowry Victims Go to the Supreme Court, EVE'S
WEEKLY, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1983, at 16.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Dowry usually refers to gifts given during the marriage to the son-in-law
or his parents in cash or kind. See RANJANA KUMARI, BRIDES ARE NOT FOR BURN-
ING 1 (1989). However, from the point of view of women's status, dowry has to be
looked at as constituting: 1) gifts given to the bride but usually not considered her
exclusive property; often the content and value of these gifts are settled before the
marriage and announced openly or discreetly; 2) gifts given to the bridegroom
before and at marriage; 3) gifts presented to the bride's in-laws. See id. "The set-
tlement often includes the enormous expenses incurred on travel and entertain-
ment of the bridegroom's party. The gift-giving often continues through the first
few years of marriage . . . ." Id. (footnote omitted).
6. See S.C. Sahu, Marriage-Why Dowryless?-A Medicologist's Considerations,
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typical; her husband, her mother-in-law, and her brother-in-
law caught hold of her, poured kerosene on her body, and set
her on fire.'
The National Crimes Record Bureau of India recorded in
1995 that an average of seventeen dowry deaths take place
every day in India.' In 1994, the official number of recorded
dowry deaths totaled 4935, and in 1993 the figures reached
almost 6000. Unless India aggressively addresses the problem
of dowry and dowry violence, innocent young women will con-
tinue to die in alarming numbers.
This Note proposes that the focus of India's dowry legisla-
tion be on ensuring that women have control over the property
that passes to their husbands and in-laws in the form of dow-
ry. Gift-giving by the bride's parents to the bridegroom's family
is so deeply entrenched that simply prohibiting dowry does not
allow the conclusion that it will not be practiced. Ensuring
that the woman benefits from the dowry property, however,
will effectively raise her financial and social status in the home
of the in-laws. It may also be the only economic security for
non-working women.
India's current dowry prohibition and dowry violence laws
have been largely ineffective in curbing either the dowry prac-
tice or the violence because the laws are too vague and do not
adequately address socio-cultural constraints. Therefore, Part
II of this Note addresses the socio-cultural constraints that
perpetuate the practice of dowry and result in the violence
in DOWRY: DIAGNOSIS & CURE 1, 2 (Bibekananda Das ed., 1989).
7. See V. Kumar, Death for Bride-Killers, EVE'S WEEKLY, July 30-Aug. 5,
1983, at 14. Sudha Jain was found dead in her in-laws' home. When the police
reached the scene of the crime, they found a stove with a pot of milk on it, a
match-box, and some burnt, wet pieces of cloth which smelt of kerosene. See id.
The in-laws claimed that Sudha had accidentally caught fire while heating milk on
the stove. See id. In dowry-related murders, pouring kerosene over the woman and
setting her alight is the most common method of killing her because kerosene is
readily available in almost every household. See Sahu, supra note 6, at 2. Further-
more, the murder can easily be made to look like a kitchen accident since burning
the woman is the surest way of destroying evidence of foul play. See id.
8. See Rani Jethmalani, Introduction to KALI'S YUG: EMPOWERIENT, LAW AND
DOWRY DEATHS 13, 14 (Rani Jetbmalani ed., 1995). The National Crimes Record
Bureau is a division of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India.
It maintains data on national crime and publishes it in its annual publication,
Crime in India. See, e.g. NATIONAL CRIMES RECORDS BUREAU, CRIE IN INDIA 1994
(1996) [hereinafter CRIE IN INDIA 1994].
9. See CRIME IN INDIA 1994, supra note 8, at 212.
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against women. It traces the socio-cultural history of the dowry
practice in order to show that voluntary gift-giving creates
incentives for violence against women. India cannot realistical-
ly address this concern by prohibiting voluntary gift-giving
altogether; such a prohibition has potentially adverse conse-
quences to non-working women, for whom the gifts provide the
sole source of economic security. Nevertheless, the legislation
could be drafted carefully to place a cap on voluntary gift-giv-
ing to prevent extortion from the woman's parents and to pun-
ish stringently the misappropriation of the woman's property.
Part III of this Note examines India's legislative response
to the practice of dowry and dowry violence. Part IV analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of India's legislation, and exam-
ines the responses of courts and law enforcement agencies
towards it. Finally, this Note makes recommendations to
strengthen the enforcement of India's legislation in light of
socio-cultural constraints.
II. THE DEFINITION OF DOWRY: ITS HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
ROOTS AND ITS MANIFESTATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
"Dowry" is movable or immovable property that the bride's
father or guardian gives to the bridegroom, his parents, or his
relatives as a condition to the marriage, and under duress,
coercion or pressure."0 In the past few decades, dowry has
become a means of attaining quick money and consumer goods
that provide luxuries." The bridegroom's family expects an
exorbitant dowry which has no relation to the bride's father's
income and wealth.'
Frequently, the bride's parents are financially unable to
pay the amount that the bridegroom's family expects from
them." Since insufficient dowries usually result in the physi-
10. See Rani Jethnmalani & P.K. Dey, Dowry Deaths and Access to Justice, in
KAI'S YUG, supra note 8, at 36, 38; see also KUMARI, supra note 5, at 43-46; B.
DEVI PRAsAD & B. VIJAYALAKsHMI, DOWRY RELATED VIOLENCE TOWARD WOMEN 1
(1988).
11. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 1-2; PRASAD & VIJAYALAKSHMI, supra note
10, at 1-2.
12. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 1-2; Vijayendra Rao, Wife-beating in a Rural
South Indian Community, in SOUVENIR OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON DOWRY AND BRIDE-BURNING IN INDIA 14-1, 14-2 (1995) [hereinafter DOWRY
CONFERENCE SOUVENIR].
13. See Rao, supra note 12, at 14-2; see also PRASAD & VIJAYALAKSHMI, supra
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cal and emotional abuse of the daughter by the husband and
in-laws, parents attempt to preserve the marriage by strug-
gling, "often desperately, to find ways and means of raising
money.., to please" 4 the husband and in-laws.
A. The Ancient Custom of Voluntary and Affectionate Gift-
Giving to the Bride, Bridegroom, and Bridegroom's Family
"Dowry" is frequently misconceived as a concept rooted in
Hindu Law and as a custom that originated in ancient times
through the practices of varadakshina"5 and kanyadaan.16
Varadakshina and kanyadaan were essentially presents that
the father of the bride gave to the bridegroom and his father
voluntarily, and not as consideration for the marriage. 7
These presents were given and received in the context of mar-
riage as a sacrament and not as a contract under Hindu
Law.
18
In addition to giving presents to the bridegroom and his
father at the time of marriage, the relatives and friends of the
bride also gave presents to the bride. The father voluntarily
bestowed his daughter with ornaments and cash within his
financial capacity at the time of marriage. 9 He gave these to
her in lieu of a share in the immovable, ancestral property."
These gifts were meant to assist the newlywed couple in start-
ing a new life.2' Moreover, these gifts constituted the bride's
stridhan, which is defined in the Hindu scriptures (the
Dharmshastras) as the bride's exclusive property.22
Stridhan itself is neither good nor bad, since gifts to the
bride are given and accepted in every society as a token of
note 10, at 2.
14. KMARI, supra note 5, at 55.
15. "Varadakshina" is a token or gift given to the bridegroom by the bride's
father. Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 77 n.5.
16. "Kanyadaan" is a gift made by the father of the bride to the father of the
bridegroom. See id. at 77 n.6.
17. See id. at 38-39.
18. See id.
19. See N.S.J. Rao, Dowry-An Inevitable Evil to Society and an Unavoidable
Curse to Indian Women, in DOWRY: DIAGNOSIS & CURE, supra note 6, at 5, 6.
20. See id.
21. See Manoj Manjari Patnaik, Uprooting the Dowry System, in DOWRY: DIAG-
NOSIS & CURE, supra note 6, at 29, 29.
22. See Enrica Garzilli, Strldhanam: A Millenary Problem, in DOWRY CONFER-
ENCE SOUVENIR, supra note 12, at 7-1, 7-3 to 7-4.
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love. However, stridhan is distinguishable from dowry, which
consists of material goods given to the bridegroom and his
relatives. As Enrica Garzilli states, "It makes a great differ-
ence to receive the dowry as a personal gift given to the bride,
which only she has the right to decide its use, and the dowry
given to the bridegroom or to his family." If the bride re-
ceives the property as a personal gift, that personal gift gives
her a certain degree of economic security and power over the
control of resources in the functioning of the home. However,
the direct transfer of the property as a gift to the bridegroom
and his family in the form of dowry restricts the woman's ac-
cess to it.
B. The Emergence of Dowry
Today, the customary practice of stridhan has given way to
the contemporary practice of dowry. Although a woman still
brings cash, ornaments, and other material goods with her to
the marriage, "most of the dowry payments are not given in
the name and control of the brides."' Instead, they are "hand-
ed over to the groom or his parents."' Many women assert
that in the early years of marriage, their husbands and in-laws
even denied them free access to their own clothing and provid-
ed them with a set each morning.26 Women often do not exer-
cise any rights over this property, apart from those granted to
them by their in-laws. The transfer of wealth to the woman in
the form of dowry not only denies her a share in the ancestral
property, but also effectively deprives her of her stridhanY
Since a woman's stridhan may be the only source of economic
security for non-working women, its transformation into dowry
may make her completely dependent on her husband and in-
laws, and as a result, more vulnerable to cruelty and abuse.
The modern practice of dowry did not originate from the
ancient Hindu customs of varadakshina and stridhan, since
dowry and bride burning do not exist all over India.28 For in-
23. Id. at 7-3.
24. PRASAD & VIJAYALAKSHMI, supra note 10, at 2.
25. Id.
26. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 51.
27. See id. at 50.
28. See Rain Narayan Tripathi, Hindu Marriage System, Hindu Scriptures and
Dowry and Bride-Burning in India, in DOWRY CONFERENCE SOUVENIR, supra note
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stance, the Hindu community native to the Indian state of
Assam does not engage in the practices of dowry and bride
burning, and they are "no less Hindu than the so called Hin-
dus of North India where thousands of brides are killed every
year for dowry."29 Furthermore, statistics provided by the Na-
tional Crime Records Bureau indicate that the practices of
dowry and bride burning are concentrated in the urban areas
of North India, including Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
and West Bengal." Dowry deaths also occur among North
Indian families who settled in but are not native to the states
of Assam, Nagaland, and Maharashtra.3 However, some
states, such as Arunachal, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Sikkim, Daman & Diu, Dadra, and Lakshadweep,
are untouched by dowry deaths.32
1. Historical Explanation for Dowry
One explanation for the emergence of dowry is that it
arose in the thirteenth or fourteenth century in response to
Muslim invasions and the spread of Muslim rule that threat-
ened the Hindu religion and worsened the economic conditions
of Hindu society.3" To protect their religion, Hindus became
more rigid in their caste 4 and religious observances and
sought to marry within their castes and sub-castes.35 Since
the downturn in economic conditions increased the difficulty of
finding a bridegroom of sound economic and social standing,
parents of daughters found themselves bidding on the bride-
groom to avoid the risk of an unsuitable match." Consequent-
12, at 17-1, 17-6.
29. Id.
30. See Himendra B. Thakur, Practical Steps Towards Saving the Lives of
25,000 Potential Victims of Dowry and Bride-Burning in India in the Next Four
Years, in DOWRY CONFERENCE SOUVENIR, supra note 12, at 16-1, 16-2, 16-6 tbl.1.
31. See id. at 16-2.
32. See id.
33. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 18.
34. Caste is "a system of social stratification more rigid than a class and
characterized by hereditary status, endogamy, and social barriers rigidly sanctioned
by custom, law, or religion." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
348 (17th ed. 1976). In India, the caste system essentially determined an
individual's social status. Arranged from highest to lowest in the social order, the
five primary castes are Brahman, Kshatriya, Sudra, Vaisya, and Varna. See id.
35. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 18.
36. See id.
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ly, dowry became the most dominant factor in the settlement of
marriage as it came to be demanded instead of being voluntari-
ly offered." In the medieval period, dowry was prevalent only
among certain upper castes, especially among the Rajput
kings,38 but by the eighteenth century, lower castes and class-
es began to practice dowry as well.39
Marriage began to lose its sanctity and became commer-
cially contractual as "Hindu traditions suffered a period of at
least 333 years of continuous anarchy during which survival
was the top priority... .'0 Consequently, dowry was the
manifestation
[of the] overall decadence during which individuals survived
by sacrificing many values, which resulted in degeneration of
all dimensions of life, including corruption of some scriptures.
The period of degeneration continued for such a long time
that it became a second nature of the people, and they forgot
how the customs started in the first place.4
Consequently, the contractual nature of marriage, which arose
from a perceived necessity to maintain cultural traditions,
established a firm foundation for the commercialization of
marriage upon which the dowry practice thrives.
2. Dowry in the Twentieth Century: A Manifestation of
Consumer Greed and Its Various Forms
The decline in moral values and the greed for consumer
goods partly explains why dowry in the twentieth century has
assumed such alarming proportions and has permeated even
those communities and classes that traditionally did not accept
the practice. Dowry has spread to all religious communities,
including Christians and Muslims in India, as a means of
achieving upward social mobility.42 Dowry giving and taking
37. See id.
38. See id The Rajput kings, who ruled ancient and medieval India before the
spread of Muslim rule in the 13th and 14th centuries, belonged to the upper
castes. See id. The practice of dowry began with them, as they were forced to give
their daughters in marriage, along with numerous costly gifts in order to avoid
humiliating defeats. See id.
39. See id. at 18-19.
40. Tripathi, supra note 28, at 17-6.
41. Id. at 17-8.
42. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 39; KUMARI, supra note 5, at 35-
1997] 643
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bears "little relation to class, caste, educational level or work-
ing status" and the "single underlying factor is the desire to
'keep up with the Jonases [sic]."'4s In other words, the finan-
cial value of the dowry given or taken symbolizes the social
status of both families, and dowry becomes the mechanism
through which the two families exhibit their wealth in order to
maintain their status with families living next door or in the
same social circle or strata.
This link between dowry and financial and social status
helps to explain why dowry is more prevalent in urban areas
and among educated families. Urban and educated families are
more likely to be conscious about their financial and social
status, and to seek to maintain the status quo. Consequently,
they view dowry wealth as a method of financing their sons'
education or repaying debts already incurred for the education
of sons."
Although both the givers and takers of dowry view it as a
symbol of social status and custom, the takers, the
bridegroom's family, usually set the dowry rates. The
bridegroom's family has greater bargaining power to set these
rates because the bridegroom's economic value is associated
with his education and earning potential, whereas the bride's
level of education and earning potential are relevant only inso-
far as they make her a potentially better wife and mother.45
Since Indian society views marriage as the ultimate goal for
women, and since the social status of her natal family is asso-
ciated with the social status of the family that she marries
into, the bridegroom's family can increase the dowry rate in
proportion to the level of education and employment of the
bridegroom.46
Furthermore, the bridegroom and the in-laws can extract
further dowry in indirect and underhanded ways. For in-
stance, they may change and increase the dowry rate well
above the agreed amount after the bride is married.48 The
37.
43. KUMARI, supra note 5, at 37.
44. See Patnaik, supra note 21, at 30; Sahu, supra note 6, at 1-2; see also
infra note 80.
45. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 39.
46. See Rao, supra note 19, at 6.
47. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 43.
48. See id. at 37.
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woman becomes a continuous source of unearned surplus as
the husband and in-laws extort more and more money and
goods from the woman's parents over the course of many years
by starving her, beating her, and ultimately by threatening to
desert the woman upon failure to comply with their de-
mands.4 9
Sometimes, the bridegroom and his family do not demand
dowry at all prior to marriage, and the demands come later."
One Delhi study showed that in sixty percent of the cases,
dowry was not demanded until after marriage. 2 After mar-
riage, dowry was demanded by the husband as a payment for
not deserting the "highly dispensable" and "easily disposable"
wife.5" In eighty-five percent of these cases, the woman's par-
ents voluntarily agreed to these demands.54 They did so as
most parents of daughters attempt to do in India, because they
associate marrying their daughters and giving dowry as part of
their duties as parents.5
Essentially, the husband and in-laws are able to extort
dowry from the woman's parents because they are aware of the
stigma that attaches to a woman and her natal family when a
married woman "has been thrown out of the house."5 6 Thus,
the husband's family uses this social reality as a bargaining
tool to meet its material demands.
49. See id. at 55-56.
50. See id. at 44-45.
51. The study was conducted by Ranjana Kumari, who has been the Director
of New Delli's Centre for Social Research and the Viee-President of the all-India
women's organization Mahila Dakshata Samiti. See generally id. at 23-28. The
geographic scope of the 1986 study focused on Delhi because it had the highest
number of registered dowry cases. See ick at 25. Data was collected through for-
mal structured interviews of dowry victims, their parents, and husbands for quan-
titative information regarding the problems of dowry and dowry victims and
through informal interviews for qualitative information. See id. at 27-28. The study
was limited to dowry victims who had reported for help or legal actions during
the calendar year 1985, with the police, the Anti-Dowry cell, women's organiza-
tions, or the press. See id. at 25. "Dowry victim" refers to anyone harassed, men-
tally or physically, upon failing to bring in marriage the demanded amount of
dowry in cash or in kind or both. See id. It also includes those who committed
suicide or were murdered or deserted by husbands for failure to bring the de-
manded dowry. See id.
52. See id. at 44.
53. Id. at 45.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 44.
56. Id. at 37.
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Even when the husband and in-laws do not explicitly de-
mand cash and goods after the initial giving of dowry at the
time of marriage, they implicitly expect it as a community
tradition-as a token of respect, affirming the higher social
status of the husband and his family over the inferior status of
the wife and her natal family.57 What was once a casual cus-
tom of giving gifts to the bride has become mandatory as the
husband's family expects a renewed flow of gifts
when a child is born; when the child is named; when the new
baby's face is shown to the maternal grandparents; when the
baby first eats solid food; when his head is shaved off, etc.
After the second child is born the whole unending cycle re-
peats itself with a renewed momentum."
The husband, in-laws, and Indian society generally interpret
the non-compliance of the woman's family with traditions as a
sign of disrespect.59 Therefore, the woman's parents attempt
to meet the expectations of the husband and in-laws because
they view gift-giving to in-laws as part of their duty to their
daughters."0 However, the decline in moral values and the
greed for material objects only partly explains the emergence
of dowry and the associated rise in the murders of young
brides.
3. The Resilience of Dowry as a Reflection of Deeply
Embedded Patriarchal Values
The emergence of dowry also reflects the views of a deeply
rooted patriarchal society that the daughter is a special gift to
be given away at the time of marriage.6 The gift of the
daughter does not necessarily reflect her subjugation in a pa-
triarchal society, but rather reflects the family's sacred duty to
society to give the girl-child to another family for whom she
will bear the valuable gift of a new generation.62
Nevertheless, the premium placed on marriage as the
57. See id. at 43-44.
58. Id. at 43.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 44, 46.
61. See Werner Menski, Dowry: A Survey of the Issues and the Literature, in
DOWRY CONFERENCE SOUVENIR, supra note 12, at 11-1, 11-6.
62. See id.
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ultimate goal for the daughter perpetuates the societal view of
women as economically and emotionally dependent beings who
need to be protected and sheltered so that they can assume
their reproductive functions. Within this context, dowry re-
flects the price that the bride's parents must pay to the
bridegroom's family to maintain the woman. The giving and
taking of dowry reflect patriarchal values and subjugates wom-
en.
These patriarchal values are deeply entrenched in Indian
society, as they are passed down through generations in the
form of myths." Indian mythology portrays women as eco-
nomically and emotionally dependent on men as wives, moth-
ers, sisters, and daughters.' Myths that portray women with
intelligence, vision, and wisdom simultaneously exhibit the de-
sire of women to be protected and sheltered.65 Men expect
women to embody this definition of womanhood, and women
attempt to meet these standards." Thus, dowry is
[the] manifestation of the political, economic and cultural
insignificance of women both in her natal family and in the
family in which she enters in marriage. Having always been
considered an economic liability within her natal home, she is
considered a temporary visitor until she departs in marriage
to her husband's home. Dowry has to be given so as to com-
pensate this non-productive being, even when the woman is
educated and has her own job and is not economically depen-
dent on her husband."
This explanation for the emergence of dowry and its per-
sistence in the late twentieth century holds great weight since
a woman's acquisition of higher education and earning poten-
tial does not necessarily lower or eliminate the dowry rate
demanded by the in-laws. As one Delhi study" indicates, hus-
bands have little respect for the education of their wives, who
can also contribute to family income.69 Moreover, the husband
and in-laws might still expect and demand dowry despite the
63. See Jethmalani, supra note 8, at 14.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 39.
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 34.
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woman's education and working status.7 °
In fact, a woman's education may actually increase the
dowry rate instead of reducing or eliminating it, because a
higher level of education implies that the woman has been
kept unmarried for a longer period of time.71 Advanced age
and education may reduce her desirability in the marriage
market because they may be perceived as making her less
physically attractive or less likely to be fair, shy, chaste, or
obedient-qualities that are viewed as desirable in a wom-
an.
7 2
The social undesirability of postponing marriage for a
woman beyond her late teens or early twenties reinforces the
low value accorded to the education and economic self-suffi-
ciency of women in Indian society. Frequently, a woman is
encouraged to pursue an education only to the extent that it
places her "in the social strata of men who may be likely candi-
dates for marriage."7s A woman who acquires an education
with the goal of becoming economically self-sufficient is gener-
ally viewed as being either licentious or arrogant. 4 Thus, she
is still discouraged, and often prohibited, by her family and in-
laws from earning an independent income. 5
When the husband and in-laws allow the woman to work,
they usually expect her to give her salary to them.7' Essen-
tially, her salary acts as a method of compensation for the
insufficient or inadequate dowry that she brings with her to
the marriage. Thus, the woman's economic dependence on men
is part of the social definition of womanhood, and the system of
dowry thrives despite the increase in the education of women.77
70. See id. at 33.
71. See Rani Jethmalani & Shally Prasad, Internalizing Patriarchy, in KALI'S
YUG, supra note 8, at 138, 142.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. This conclusion was drawn by the Delhi-based Women's Action Research
and Legal Action for Women (WARLAW) based on recent studies that it conduct-
ed. See id. at 143. WARLAW was founded in 1992 by Rani Jethmalani who argues
cases at the Indian Supreme Court level. WARLAW has conducted cases referred
to it by several women's organizations, and is currently handling 85 such cases in
the District Court, High Court, and Supreme Court. See id.
75. See id. at 142. Recent gender statistics disclosed by the Union Department
of Statistics show that the literacy rate among women in India is 39.42%. See id.
The female work participation rate is 22.69%. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 142-43.
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C. The Nature of Dowry Violence and the Urgency of Effective
Legislation Prohibiting Dowry and Dowy-Related Violence
Dowry violence occurs when the husband and in-laws are
dissatisfied with the amount of cash, ornaments, and consumer
goods that the woman's family presents to them during the
first few years of marriage.s Usually, it comes to light only
when there is a violation of the customary arrangements and
expectations concerning a particular marriage. We only come
to know of dowry problems when one side refuses to honour
its part in the arrangements or when the other side exploits
its assumed position of strength and superiority by demand-
ing more and more. 9
This is because dowry is socially acceptable, and the woman's
parents themselves concede to the demands that fall within
their capacities. °
Ordinarily, the woman endures the violence and remains
in the in-laws' home in order to live up to the "respectable
position of wife or daughter-in-law in society" and upon the
urging of her parents.8 The woman's parents usually encour-
age her to endure the violence with "silent courage" and advise
her to adjust to her new family,82 primarily because they fear
the stigma of a married daughter leaving the home and return-
ing to her parents." Their way of protecting her from abuse is
to succumb to the demands of the husband and in-laws be-
78. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5; PRASAD & VIJAYALAKSIII, supra
note 10, at 3. Dowry-related problems usually arise when: 1) a bride's parents fail
to meet dowry demands over and above what had been agreed upon at the time
of marriage; 2) the remaining portion of a promised dowry is left unpaid; 3) the
husband and in-laws are dissatisfied with the items given; 4) the bride's parents
make false promises out of fear that their daughter might remain unmarried; or
5) the parents of the bride are unable to meet the expectations of the husband
and in-laws, which may change over time. See id. at 3-4.
79. Menski, supra note 61, at 11-8.
80. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 39; KUMARI, supra note 5, at 2.
Proponents of dowry justify the practice as a way of providing a girl with a share
of the family property. Kumari notes: "Parents who demand dowry justify it on
several grounds. Firstly, since they have to pay dowry for their daughter, why not
take it for their sons? Secondly, fathers of educated boys want to get back the
money spent on the son's education." Id.
81. KUMARI, supra note 5, at 61.
82. See id. at 62.
83. See id.
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cause they measure her well-being in terms of remaining mar-
ried.' The daughter feels duty-bound to preserve the mar-
riage because of the huge expenditures incurred by her par-
ents.'
Because there is a socio-cultural emphasis on marriage as
the ultimate goal for women, a woman's education and her
ability to earn an independent income do not make her less
susceptible to dowry-related violence and murder. In fact, her
economic independence may become another vehicle through
which the husband and in-laws can extract money from her.
Any defiance on her part may heighten the abuse. For in-
stance, Tripta Sharma was physically and mentally harassed
and tortured by her husband and in-laws for not giving her full
salary to them until one day she was burned to death in the
house of her in-laws under mysterious circumstances. 85
Even when the woman gives her earnings to her husband
or her in-laws or both, they may still physically and emotional-
ly abuse her for not bringing sufficient dowry to the mar-
riage." Despite her economic self-sufficiency, she may choose
to live with the violence until her husband or in-laws murder
her as did the in-laws of twenty-seven-year old Usha.5 In a
letter to a friend, she wrote: "When I go back from work no-one
speaks to me. They don't offer me tiffin or coffee. My husband
is a coward and I am giving all my earnings to him."89 Within
one year of marriage, Usha was dead.9"
Other times, educated and economically self-sufficient
women falsely believe that they can control the abuse by using
their own salaries to buy things the in-laws want, as did Ph.D.
graduate of physics Sangeeta Goel.9' Sangeeta was acting like
a "dutiful" daughter when she told her parents that they
should not worry about her and that she would win the hearts
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 60-63.
87. See Daksha Hathi, Bride Burning and After: Making a Farce of Tragedy,
DECCAN HERALD (Bangalore, India), Sept. 24, 1994, Society sec., at 7.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See Satya Agarwal, Speech at the First International Conference on Dowry
and Bride-Burning in India, Harvard Law School (Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1995) (uncle of
Sangeeta Goel, speaking about dowry violence and his niece's case) (videotaped
copy of conference on file with author).
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of her in-laws. But her salary did not meet the demands of her
in-laws and five months into the marriage, on April 14, 1994,
she was found poisoned in the house of her in-laws under mys-
terious circumstances.92 These tragic deaths support the con-
clusion that the woman usually perceives two options: living
with the abuse until her husband or in-laws kill her; or com-
mitting suicide when the abuse becomes unbearable.
D. Why Prohibit Dowry? Why Education and Inheritance
Rights Will Not Dismantle the Dowry System and Dowry
Violence
The social acceptance of violence against women in connec-
tion with dowry, and the loyalty of women and their families to
the institution of marriage, suggest that simply expanding the
educational and economic opportunities for women will not
dismantle the system of dowry and dowry-related violence.
Women are likely to stay in violent marriages despite their
educational and employment status, as the cases of Usha,
Tripta Sharma, and Sangeeta Goel indicate. 9 Their asser-
tions of economic independence threaten the stability of the
power structure in the in-laws' home and makes them vulnera-
ble to death by murder or suicide.
Similarly, giving inheritance rights to women in place of
dowry does not necessarily suggest the conclusion that the
practice of dowry and dowry-related violence will disappear.
While giving inheritance rights to women is desirable because
such rights provide women with economic security, a woman's
assertion of these rights may also pose a threat to the stability
of the power structure in the in-laws' home and make the
woman vulnerable to violence in the absence of social support
from her parents and brothers.
Furthermore, a woman's inheritance may only disguise the
practice of dowry since the bridegroom and his family may
then seek the bride who inherits the greatest amount of prop-
erty. 4 Consequently, the bride's life may still be in danger if
her husband or in-laws decide at some point during the mar-
riage that the value of the property or income derived from the
92. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 86, 88-92.
94. See Menski, supra note 61, at 11-2.
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property is insufficient. Or, if the husband or in-laws find the
income potential of the property to be insufficient, they may
still demand dowry to compensate for the shortfall; if the
woman's parents refuse or are unable to meet the demand, the
woman would remain vulnerable to cruelty, harassment, and
murder by her husband and in-laws. Thus, giving inheritance
rights to women might transform the nature of dowry without
eliminating it and without offering real protection to women.
In addition, if the woman is the sole benefactor of the
inherited property, the husband and in-laws might still de-
mand dowry because they would not reap the benefits of the
property.95 Although the woman may acquire financial securi-
ty through her share of inherited property, she may be reluc-
tant to fight for her inheritance rights at the cost of alienating
her brothers who customarily inherit all of the parents' proper-
ty.96
Thus, the only real and practical solution to reducing and
eliminating the practice of dowry and dowry-related violence is
to create a social environment for women in which they can
enjoy the expansion of educational and economic opportunities
and the inheritance rights that should be given to them as
equal members of society. To create this social environment,
the legal system should aggressively condemn the practice of
dowry and dowry-related violence, since the violence against
women is intimately related to property and the rights of wom-
en over their personal property.
II. INDIA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE DOWRY PRACTICE
AND TO DOWRY-RELATED VIOLENCE
India has taken steps to penalize violence against women
and to acknowledge the intimate relationship between violence
and property. In 1961, India passed the Dowry Prohibition
Act,97 the first systematic law to prohibit dowry 8 and the
95. See Ved Kumari, State's Response to the Problem of Rape and Dowry, in
WOMEN & LAW: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 104, 124 (Lotika Sarkar & B.
Sivaramayya eds., 1994).
96. See id.
97. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961).
98. The original Dowry Act defined dowry as:
[Alny property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either di-
rectly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage;
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demand for dowry. India amended this Act twice, once in 1984
and again in 1986, in order to rectify several inherent weak-
nesses and loopholes in the Act.99 Nevertheless, the ambiguity
in the definitions of "dowry" and "demand for dowry," along
with weak enforcement mechanisms, continue to limit the Act's
effectiveness in curbing the practice of dowry.'
In 1986, an amendment to the Dowry Prohibition Act
introduced the offense of dowry death into the Indian Penal
Code.' This offense deems the husband or his relatives to
have caused the woman's death in cases where the woman dies
of burns or bodily injury under unnatural circumstances within
seven years of marriage and where there is evidence that she
suffered cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry.' °
Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the definitions of "dowry" and
"cruelty," and the requirement of proof of the link between the
two, pose an onerous evidentiary burden for the prosecu-
tion.
0 3
To address the problem of proof in dowry murders, the
Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986 introduced section
113B into the Indian Evidence Act.'" Section 113B creates
or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the mar-
riage ....
Id. § 2(a)-(b).
99. In 1984, the Act was amended to replace "as consideration of the mar-
riage" with "in connection with the marriage." Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act,
No. 63, § 2(a)-(b) (1984). In 1986, the definition of dowry was further amended to
include any property given "any time after the marriage." Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 2, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 188. See infra notes 116-17
and accompanying text.
100. See discussion infra Part IV.I-5, 7-8.
101. INDIA PEN. CODE § 304B, as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)
Act, No. 43, § 10, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 188. The dowry death offense under
§ 304B reads:
Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subject-
ed to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her hus-
band for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Id.
102. See id.
103. See discussion infra Part IV.A.6.
104. Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, § 113B, 4 INDIA CODE 11 (1872), as amended
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the presumption that the husband and in-laws committed the
dowry death if the woman was subjected to harassment in
connection with dowry before her death.0 5 Nevertheless, the
seven-year limitation imposed under the dowry death offense
provision enables perpetrators to wait to murder their wives
until the seven-year limitation has expired.
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983 intro-
duced section 113A into the Indian Evidence Act.'0 6 Section
113A creates a presumption of abetting suicide by a married
woman if the suicide occurs within seven years from the date
of her marriage and if the husband or his relatives had sub-
jected her to cruelty.0 7 This provision is desirable because it
recognizes the social reality of the cruelty and the abuse of
married women that drives them to suicide and the active role
of the husband and in-laws in assisting the woman's suicide.
However, the seven-year limitation allows offenders to escape
penalty for the crime of the abetment of suicide when the sev-
en-year limitation has expired.
Furthermore, the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act
of 1983 addresses dowry violence short of murder or suicide
through the insertion of section 498A into the Indian Penal
Code.' O8 Section 498A makes physical and mental cruelty to
the woman by her husband and in-laws an offense.' 9 The in-
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 12, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 191.
105. Section 113B reads as follows:
When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death
of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had
been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connec-
tion with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
Id.
106. Indian Evidence Act, No. 1, § 113A, 4 INDIA CODE 11 (1872), as amended
by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, No. 46, § 7, 1984 A.I.R. 71 (Nag.) 70.
107. Section 113A states:
When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had
been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is
shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years
from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of
her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having
regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Id.
108. INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A, as amended by Criminal Law (Second Amend-
ment) Act, No. 46, § 2, 1984 A.I.R. 71 (Nag.) 68.
109. Section 498A defines cruelty as follows:
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tent of this legislation was to bring domestic violence, which
was largely considered a private affair, under public scrutiny
and state action.11° However, the ambiguity in the definition
of cruelty, and the immense burden of proof required to prove
cruelty, make this provision of limited value to victims.'
In addition to the above legislation, which attempts to
reduce the practice of dowry and dowry-related violence, a
provision of the Indian Penal Code" enables a woman to
make a case of criminal breach of trust."' It offers women a
criminal remedy for the misappropriation of their personal
property, or strFdhan, by their husbands or in-laws." Never-
theless, the general nature of the provision and the "trust"
terminology have made lower courts reluctant to apply it to the
marital relationship."' Consequently, the effectiveness of this
provision to protect women's access to property is very limited.
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure
by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
Id.
110. See D.N. Sandanshiv & Jolly Mathew, Legal Reform in Dowry Laws, in
KALI'S YUG, supra note 8, at 79, 79.
111. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
112. INDIA PEN. CODE § 405.
113. Section 405 defines criminal breach of trust as follows:
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any
dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust
is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he
has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust."
Id.
114. See id.
115. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO DOWRY
AND DOWRY-RELATED VIOLENCE
A. The Dowry Prohibition Act
1. The Definition of Dowry
The current version of the Dowry Prohibition Act defines
"dowry" as:
[Amny property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly-
(a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) By the parents of either party to a marriage or by
any other person to either party to the marriage to any other
person,
At or before or any time after the marriage in connection
with the marriage ...."r1
The words "in connection with the marriage," added in 1984,
replace the words "as consideration for the marriage,""7
which appeared in the original Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961.
On its face, this definition is comprehensive because dowry
includes not only what the bridegroom and his family demand
or take, or agree to take, but also includes that which the bride
and her family demand or take, or agree to take."8 The
words "in connection with the marriage" further suggest that
dowry includes any transfer of property or consumer goods
that flows from one side to the other in order to complete the
marriage transaction or to sustain the marriage arrangement.
As such, the definition of dowry suggests that anything given
before, after, or at the time of marriage may constitute dow-
ry.
119
Consequently, the words "in connection with the marriage"
are an improvement over the original Dowry Prohibition Act of
1961, which required property or valuable security to be given
116. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 2, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961), as amended
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 2 (1984) and Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 2, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 188.
117. Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 2(a) (1984).
118. See PARAS DIWAN & PEEYUSHI DIWAN, WOMEN AND LEGAL PROTECTION
161 (1995).
119. See id. at 150.
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or agreed to be given "in consideration of the marriage." To
meet the statutory requirement, "in consideration of the mar-
riage," the woman and her relatives had to prove that the
husband promised to marry the woman only on the condition
that dowry was given, or that dowry was the price paid for the
husband's agreement to marry the woman.120
Although the words "in consideration of the marriage"
sought to distinguish dowry given under compulsion from vol-
untary gifts given out of love and affection,"2 this provision,
in actual practice, operated in favor of the defendant husband
and in-laws. Earlier judicial rulings show that the husband
and in-laws easily argued that the dowry was given out of
natural love and affection and not in return for the promise to
marry. For instance, the Supreme Court dismissed Satya Rani
Chadha's case, in which the woman's in-laws demanded a
scooter two days before the bride was burned to death, on the
ground that the demand pertained to a gift on the occasion of
the birth of the child and was not in "consideration of the mar-
riage.12 Despite the insertion of "in connection with the
marriage" into the definition of dowry, section 2 remains a
major stumbling block in the implementation of anti-dowry
laws because the woman and her relatives still bear an im-
mense burden to prove that the gifts were extorted by the in-
laws and not voluntarily given."= Regardless of the compre-
hensive definition of dowry under section 2, dowry does not in-
clude voluntary and affectionate presents made from one side
of the marriage to the other.2
Furthermore, the requirement that gifts be given or taken
"in connection with the marriage" fails to take into account
that marriage transactions are covert in a majority of the cases
120. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 74.
121. See id. at 75.
122. PUDR v. Union of India, [1982] 2 S.C.C. 253; see Jethmalani & Dey, su-
pra note 10, at 46-49.
123. See KUtAIU, supra note 5, at 75.
124. See Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 3, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961), as
amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 3(2)(a)-(b) (1984). Sec-
tion 3(2) states that dowry does not apply to:
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the
bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf) ... [or]
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the
bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf) ....
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and that the parties have an unwritten understanding not to
record such transactions." In the absence of any written re-
cord of such transactions, it is difficult to prove that gifts given
constitute dowry because they were given or taken "in connec-
tion with the marriage." Consequently, dowry takers can easily
maneuver around this technicality and extort unlimited
amounts of gifts through unrecorded transactions.
The "in connection with the marriage" requirement also
overlooks the fact that gifts are likely to be given as a result of
subtle community pressures or fear that their daughters may
remain unmarried.26 For instance, gifts may be voluntarily
given to the extent that the woman's parents feel that they
have an obligation to do so in order to ensure that the mar-
riage takes place smoothly.' Or, they may be given after the
marriage to ensure the preservation of the marriage or to con-
trol or halt the abuse of daughters by the husband or in-
laws.'
Consequently, the words "in connection with the marriage"
serve as an incentive merely for offenders to change the way in
which they make their demands for dowry. Instead of explicitly
demanding property or valuable security in the form of cash
and consumer goods as a condition to the marriage, the hus-
band and in-laws may wait until the marriage takes place
before making their demands. The Delhi study supports this
view, as it indicates that in sixty percent of the cases, the
husband and in-laws made no demands for dowry until after
the marriage.'29
The consequences of maneuvering around the "in connec-
tion with the marriage" requirement are significant since edu-
cated families, particularly those living in urban areas, are the
most likely to know that both dowry and the demand for dowry
are criminal offenses under the Dowry Prohibition Act.3 0
Therefore, they are the most able to structure their transac-
tions to avoid criminal penalties. The law needs to specifically
address this socio-economic group in order to curb the practice,
125. See KUMAPJ, supra note 5, at 75.
126. See id.
127. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2-3.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
129. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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since this group widely practices exorbitant forms of dowry.' 3'
Another problem posed by the "in connection with the
marriage" requirement is that offenders can maneuver around
this technicality without even making an explicit demand for
cash, property or consumer goods before or after the marriage.
The husband and in-laws implicitly expect that the woman's
parents will continually supply them with presents throughout
the course of the marriage as a matter of custom.3 2 Further,
since these gifts are expected on every special occasion that
occurs during the course of the marriage, they may not neces-
sarily fit the legal requirement of being made "in connection
with the marriage."
Another difficulty with the present definition of dowry is
that it allows the bridegroom and his parents to take an un-
limited amount of gifts from the bride's family on the ground
that the gifts were voluntarily given. The bridegroom's family
can easily prevail on this argument because the definition of
dowry does not take into account the social reality of dowry as
a series of payments made by the bride's family to the
bridegroom and his family over a course of many years.'
Nor does the definition of dowry take into account the fact that
dowry rates change once the marriage takes place and that the
husband's family has greater bargaining power in adjusting
the terms of the explicit or implicit marriage contract.3 4
Consequently, the dowry rates charged or expected by the
husband and in-laws may be exorbitant, and the bride's family
may incur huge financial liabilities and suffer severe financial
hardship.' Under such circumstances, gift-giving can hardly
be called voluntary. Nevertheless, such gift-giving escapes the
legal definition of dowry because the Act neglects to put a
ceiling on the money spent by the bride's parents on marriage
expenses and on presents to the bride, bridegroom, and in-
laws.
Therefore, the definition of dowry should be further
amended to put a ceiling on the presents voluntarily given to
the bride and bridegroom, and on marriage expenses incurred
131. See Patnaik, supra note 21, at 30.
132. See supra text accompanying note 57.
133. See supra text accompanying note 58.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14, 60.
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by the bride's parents. This recommendation is consistent with
the one that the Joint Committee of both Houses in the legisla-
ture"3 6 had made in 1980 after studying the weaknesses of
the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. The Joint Committee rec-
ommended that:
In order to ensure that there is no element of compulsion
from the side of the bridegroom for dowry and to curb the evil
practice of ostentation in the marriage ceremonies,... there
is no remedy except to prescribe a ceiling on the presents to
be made to the bridegroom or his family members and the
total marriage expenses likely to be incurred on different
occasions. 37
However, the legislature elected not to introduce this rec-
ommendation into the Dowry Prohibition Act through the 1984
and 1986 amendments.3 ' Therefore, the effectiveness of the
Act depends greatly on the ability of courts to distinguish be-
tween voluntary and forced gift-giving.
Practically, this distinction is very difficult to make unless
gift-making is carefully analyzed in the context of the societal
and community pressures; there also must be an analysis of
the individual dynamics of the husband's and in-laws' home in
which the woman lives and the parents' home that she left
behind. Therefore, the definition of dowry should be clarified to
include gifts given before, during, or after the marriage to the
other married party or to that party's relatives in response to
explicit or implicit demands or expectations. Putting a ceiling
on voluntary gift-giving to in-laws would offer additional pro-
tection to the woman's family because it would make it more
difficult for the husband's family to extort exorbitant amounts
of property under the rubric of voluntary gifts.
136. On December 19, 1980, the Parliament of India appointed a joint commit-
tee of the Houses (the two houses are Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha) to exam-
ine the effectiveness of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 and to suggest amend-
ments accordingly. Report of the Joint Committee of the Houses to Examine the
Question of the Working of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Aug. 6, 1982 [herein-
after Dowry Report], reprinted in DIWAN & D1WAN, supra note 118, at 435-73.
137. Id. § 3.7, reprinted in DIWAN & DIWAN, supra note 118, at 462.
138. See DIWAN & DIWAN, supra note 118, at 163.
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2. The Offense of Giving and Taking Dowry and Abetting the
Giving and Taking of Dowry
The giving, taking, and the abetting of the giving and
taking of dowry is a criminal offense under section 3 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act.1 9 It is punishable by both impris-
onment and a fine.40 The 1986 amendment to section 3 in-
creased the penalty of the offense from the six-month imprison-
ment term stipulated in the 1961 document to a five-year mini-
mum with a fine of 15,000 rupees.' Despite the stricter pen-
alty under the amended section 3, the Act has been ineffective
in reducing the practice of dowry because it limits the broad
language of the definition of dowry in section 2, equally penal-
izes the taker and the giver of dowry, and gives the courts
great discretion in reducing the minimum penalty set forth in
section 3.142
a. Limiting the Definition of Dowry
Section 3 limits the broad definition of dowry under sec-
tion 2 by explicitly excluding from the purview of dowry "pres-
ents" which are given at the time of marriage to the "bride" or
"bridegroom" without any demand having been made for
them.' It requires the bride to maintain a list of presents
that she receives at the time of marriage, and the bridegroom
to keep a similar list of his own to record the presents that he
receives.'44
These lists must conform with the Dowry Prohibition
(Maintenance of List of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom)
Rules, 1985.' These Rules require the bride and bridegroom
to include specific information in their respective lists about
139. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 3, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961).
140. See id.
141. Id., as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 3(1)(a)-
(b), 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 189. A rupee is Indian currency; a fine of 15,000 rupees
is roughly equivalent to US$420.
142. See discussion infra Part IVA2.a.-.c.
143. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 3, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961), as amended
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 3(2)(a)-(b) (1984).
144. Id., as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 3(2)
(1984).
145. Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of List of Presents to the Bride and
Bridegroom) Rules, 1985, at 9 (1995) (unofficial pamphlet on file with the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law).
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the description and approximate value of the presents given to
them and their relationship to the giver." 6 Each must sign
his or her respective list."7
To constitute "presents" under section 3, gifts must not
only appear on the legally required lists, but also must be of a
"customary nature" and "not excessive... with regard to the
financial status" of the giver.'48 However, the terms "custom-
ary nature" and "not excessive" are left undefined."
Generally, the section 3 list requirement is desirable from
the perspective of the woman's welfare because it facilitates
her ability to prove that presents given to her at the time of
marriage by her relatives and friends constitute her exclusive
personal property or strfdhan. In the absence of any such writ-
ten record, the woman is likely to lose her claim for the recov-
ery of her stridhan because of the almost impossible task of
proving which items were given to her as presents at the time
of marriage.
Nevertheless, the list is of limited value to the woman
because section 3 and the related Rules on the Maintenance of
the List do not require both parties to sign and register the
lists. The absence of a signature and registration requirement
enables both the wife and the husband to back-date and ma-
nipulate their respective lists to support their individual
claims that the items given to each at the time of marriage
constitute "presents" under section 3. The list's amenability to
manipulation by both parties weakens the woman's claim for
the recovery of her strFdhan by reducing the reliability of the
list in court.
Consequently, section 3 of the Act should be amended to
require both parties to the marriage to register these lists with
special courts, which should be designed to handle marital
disputes. Provisions should also be made to allow the parties to
incorporate into the list any gifts made after the time of mar-
riage. This would protect each of them from the contradictory
claims of the other upon the dissolution of the marriage. It
would also facilitate control by both the wife and the husband
146. See id. § 2(3)(c)(i)-(iv).
147. See id. § 2(3)(d).
148. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 3, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961), as amended
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 3(2) (1984).
149. See id.
662 [Vol. XXI:3
BRIDE BURNING IN INDIA
over their respective personal property. Furthermore, the regis-
tration requirement would enable parents to give presents
directly to the daughter in her name and for her benefit. Since
marriage transactions would be recorded, the woman's proper-
ty rights would be more secure under this scheme, and hus-
bands and in-laws would have less maneuverability to compel
the woman's parents to hand over presents directly to them.
To a certain extent, the registration requirement would
restore the practice of stridhan in place of dowry. Since
stridhan is often the only source of economic security for wom-
en, the conversion of dowry into strfdhan would offer the wom-
an more control over the resources in the functioning of her
new home and, along with such control, greater social status
within the family structure. The woman then will not be com-
pelled to complain, as many women currently are, that her
husband and in-laws control her and deny her free access to
food, clothing, cash, and ornaments. 5 '
The Joint Committee of Parliament also acknowledged
that listing and registering presents in the bride's name would
help to ensure that the cash, clothes, and ornaments given to
her are for her exclusive benefit.'5 ' The Joint Committee
went further and recommended that:
[in order to make the position of the bride more secure and
to see that her presents are not misappropriated by her hus-
band or her in-laws on one pretext or the other, such pres-
ents should neither be allowed to be transferred nor disposed
of for a minimum period of five years from the date of mar-
riage without the prior permission of the Family Court (by
whatever name called) on an application made by her.'52
Incorporating such a requirement on the use and disposal of
the bride's personal property into section 3 would offer the
bride additional legal protection over the control and use of her
150. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
151. See Dowry Report, supra note 136, § 3.6, reprinted in DIWAN & D1WAN,
supra note 118, at 461. The Joint Committee stated in its Report that:
(I]n order to make . . . sure that the presents, in the form of cash, orna-
ments, clothes or other articles made to the bride at or before or after
the marriage, are exclusively for the bride's benefit, they should be listed
and registered in her name.
Id.
152. Id., reprinted in DIWAN & DIWAN, supra note 118, at 461-62.
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property. This legal control could give the bride greater bar-
gaining power over its use in the context of her relationship
with her husband and in-laws.
Despite the desirability of provisions that require the reg-
istration of lists and that control the husband's and in-laws' ac-
cess to the woman's property, these provisions may only nomi-
nally affect the woman's control over her personal property.
The list might not serve its function of facilitating the distinc-
tion between presents and dowry because the woman has so-
cial and cultural incentives to keep many items off the list. She
has the intense pressure of adjusting to a new lifestyle in a
new home as she tries to win the hearts of in-laws who judge
her more by the amount of material goods that she brings with
her than by her personal qualities.5 ' She also bears the soci-
etal burden of making the marriage work and fears the social
stigma associated with divorce or her husband's and in-laws'
desertion of her."5 Furthermore, the huge financial invest-
ment that the woman's parents make in her marriage deters
the woman from doing anything in the marriage that could
upset her husband and in-laws,'55 including keeping a list.
Aside from socio-cultural constraints, the list requirement
is a limited vehicle for protecting the woman's property be-
cause it is antagonistic to the concept of marriage. Marriage
implies unity and creates the expectation that the presents
they each receive at the time of marriage are for their joint
ownership and enjoyment. Any attempt by the bride to make a
technical distinction between the presents made to her and
those made to her husband is likely to instigate family dishar-
mony. Her in-laws are more likely than not to interpret her
actions as a reflection of her poor moral character-her greed,
arrogance, and licentiousness."' And, she is unlikely to begin
her marriage with a fight over property that would make her
difficult transition even more difficult. She has greater incen-
tives to postpone making any claims over her property until
she has greater footing in the marriage.
Even where the bride may want to register certain pres-
ents in her own name for her protection, her husband and in-
153. See discussion supra Part H.B.2.
154. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 61-62.
155. See id. at 62.
156. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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laws may compel her not to do so. They can still use the list
requirement as a tool to manipulate her and to reinforce her
low position in the family structure. If she refuses to comply
with their wishes, they can threaten to desert her or kill her,
and to bring a new bride into the family.'57 The husband and
in-laws can easily justify their actions by placing the blame on
the woman for her alleged incapacity to adjust to the new
family setting. Moreover, her parents may urge her to adjust to
the new family setting.5 Against these socio-cultural pres-
sures, the woman is likely to yield to the demands of her hus-
band, in-laws, and parents. Nevertheless, the registration
requirement, along with provisions intended to control the
husband's and in-laws' access to her property, should be legis-
lated in order to make it more difficult for the husband and in-
laws to extort all of her property.
Furthermore, section 3 should remove the requirement for
gifts made at the time of marriage to be of a "customary na-
ture" and "not excessive with regard to the financial status of
the giver." The terms "customary nature" and "not excessive"
are too ambiguous to effectively deter the husband and in-laws
from extorting unlimited gifts from the woman's parents under
the guise of voluntary gift-giving. Instead, putting a ceiling on
the value of transferable, voluntary gifts would more effective-
ly control the amount of wealth that passes between the fami-
lies.
b. Penalizing the Giver and Taker of Dowry
Putting the giver and taker of dowry in the same category
for punishment penalizes the victims of the dowry practice
along with the perpetrators. It discourages women and their
parents from reporting the extortion of cash, ornaments, and
consumer goods by the husband and in-laws because they are
equally culpable under the law for giving in to the explicit and
implicit demands and expectations of the husband and in-laws.
The woman is unlikely to report her husband and in-laws to
the authorities if doing so will implicate her parents, or if it
will diminish her husband's and in-laws' social or financial
support. Otherwise, she may end up alienating both her
157. See KUtMARI, supra note 5, at 23.
158. See id. at 61-62.
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husband's family and her own.
The Joint Committee of the Parliament correctly recog-
nized that the woman's parents should not be equated with the
takers of dowry because they "do not give dowry out of their
free will but are compelled to do so. Further, when both the
giver and the taker are punishable, no giver can be expected to
come forward to make a complaint."' The Committee con-
cluded that only those who take or abet the taking of dowry
should be punished to deter the practice of dowry. 6 ' Howev-
er, the Parliament elected not to incorporate this recommenda-
tion into the Act. In doing so, it failed to acknowledge that the
dowry takers are more blameworthy and morally reprehensible
than the dowry givers because they consciously extort goods
from the socially vulnerable bride's family.
In contrast, the bride and her parents respond to the exor-
bitant material demands of the bridegroom and in-laws as a
result of deeply embedded patriarchal values that link the
institution of marriage and its preservation to the woman's
happiness. 6' Essentially, they tend to comply with the in-
laws' demands out of what they perceive to be love for their
daughters, even though in actual practice, the marriage leads
to the physical and emotional abuse of their daughters.
Since their motives for giving are good, the woman's par-
ents are less blameworthy for their actions even though those
actions produce undesirable results. Therefore, the law should
not place the woman's parents on the same footing as the hus-
band and in-laws, since the latter parties manipulate their
superior bargaining position, and since they are motivated
primarily by greed.
The legal system is potentially more effective than educa-
tion in deterring immoral behavior, such as greed, through
enhancing criminal punishment. In contrast, education offers a
more effective means for breaking down the socially embedded
patriarchal values reinforced by the woman's parents who
prefer compliance with the demands for dowry and allow their
daughters to tolerate spousal and in-law abuse over divorce or
159. Dowry Report, supra note 136, § 3.11, reprinted in DINVAN & DBIVAN, supra
note 118, at 463.
160. See id. § 3.12.
161. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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economic self-sufficiency. 62 Therefore, in order to protect the
woman effectively, section 3 should be amended to penalize
only the taker or the abettor of the taking of dowry.
c. Punishment for the Offense of Taking, Giving, and
Abetting the Giving and Taking of Dowry
Despite the stricter penalty increasing the penalty under
the 1986 Amendment Act to a five-year minimum with a fine
of 15,000 rupees from the six-month jail term stipulated in the
1961 Act, the practice of dowry has not been reduced. The
ineffectiveness of this penalty as a deterrent is largely due to
language in section 3 that gives the court wide discretionary
powers to reduce the sentence or to impose a monetary fine as
an alternative to imprisonment. Section 3(1) states that "the
Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in
the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of
less than five years."" The effect of this language is to treat
the taking of dowry as a crime that warrants less serious pun-
ishment according to the circumstances of each case.
For instance, the determinations of the judge are vulnera-
ble to factors such as the biases of the judge and the social and
economic status of the husband and his family. Since the prac-
tice of dowry is so prevalent and socially acceptable, section
3(1) should be amended to remove the discretion of judges in
reducing the punishment. Furthermore, penalties imposed on
offenders should increase with the amount of dowry extorted
from the woman's family and proportionately to the amount of
annual income of the woman's family.
3. The Offense of the Demand for Dowry
Demanding dowry is an offense under section 4 of the
current Dowry Prohibition Act. Section 4 states:
If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the par-
ents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom,
as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
162. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 61-62.
163. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 3(1), 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961), as
amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 3(a) (1984) and Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 3(a)-(b), 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 189.
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imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees.'"
In acknowledging the demand for dowry as a separate crime
from the offense of the taking or abetting the taking of dowry,
section 4 is a move in the right direction towards disapproving
the activity that rises to and feeds the social evil of dowry.
However, a weakness in section 4, while it recognizes that
the demand for dowry can be direct and indirect, is that it
never defines the term "indirect." With the term left undefined,
victims and their families have an enormously difficult time
proving that dowry was demanded in the absence of any ex-
plicit or tangible demand. Also, courts have tremendous discre-
tion in determining whether an implicit demand can be derived
from the facts of a particular case. These determinations are
likely to be based on the disposition and knowledge of the
judge about the characteristics of the dowry problem. Conse-
quently, inconsistent determinations are likely at both the
horizontal level, across trial courts, and the vertical level, by
appellate courts.
In order to rectify this inconsistency in court determina-
tions, section 4 should be strengthened to give guidelines to
courts as to what can constitute an indirect or implicit de-
mand. Giving explicit guidelines is especially critical because
the demand for dowry can take subtle forms, and frequently
takes the form of expectations of the bridegroom's family over
the course of the marriage. Unless courts are sensitive to the
various forms, offenders can easily escape penalty by arguing
that gifts were given voluntarily in the absence of an explicit
demand. Indirect demand should be defined to include expecta-
tions of the bridegroom's family for continuous gifts from the
bride's family over the course of the marriage. These expecta-
tions should be assessed by the actions and treatment of the
husband and in-laws towards the woman in the marital home.
For instance, the husband's and in-laws' control over the
woman's access to food and clothing, and their physical and
emotional abuse of the woman, constitute an implicit demand
for dowry when the level of abuse and violence varies with the
164. Id. § 4, 6 INDIA CODE 40E (1961) (as amended 1984).
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supply of presents that her parents bestow on her husband and
in-laws. The expectation is that the woman's parents will give
gifts to the husband and in-laws in order to control or halt the
abuse of their daughter. Although the demand is not explicit, it
is implicit in the blackmail tactics used by the husband and in-
laws.
In addition, the husband's and in-laws' control over the
woman's salary should also constitute an implicit demand for
dowry. Here, the expectation of the in-laws is that they have
an absolute right to the woman's salary. Essentially, the
woman's salary takes the form of dowry since it makes up for
an alleged deficiency in the initial giving of the dowry.
165
Nevertheless, the woman's salary is unlikely to fit into the
technical definition of dowry or the demand for dowry because
it comes from the woman herself and is likely to be considered
a nominal bonus.
The interpretation of indirect demand depends heavily on
the legal definition of dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Therefore, the definition of dowry under section 2 of the Act
should be clarified as discussed earlier, to incorporate the sub-
tle forms that dowry takes and the circumstances under which
it occurs. A more specific and explicit definition of dowry could
support a consistent, liberal construction of demand for the
purposes of penalizing the perpetrators of the offense for the
demand for dowry.
4. Failure to Transfer Dowry to the Bride
Section 6 provides that if any dowry is received in viola-
tion of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the recipient
must transfer the dowry to the woman.166 It states:
Where any dowry is received by any person other than the
woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that
person shall transfer it to the woman-
(a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within
three months after the date of marriage; or
(b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the
165. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
166. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 6, 6 INDIA CODE 40F (1961), as amended
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 5 (1984) and Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 5, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 189.
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marriage, within three months after the date of its receipt; or
(c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a
minor, within three months after she has attained the age of
eighteen years and pending such transfer, shall hold it in
trust for the benefit of the woman."7
The failure to transfer the dowry to the woman within the
stipulated period is punishable by imprisonment for a term
between six months and two years or with a fine not less than
five thousand rupees, but which can extend up to ten thousand
rupees, or both.'68
In the event that the woman dies before her husband or
in-laws transfer the dowry to her, her rights to the dowry pass
to her heirs.'69 Furthermore, if she dies of unnatural causes
within seven years of marriage, the dowry must be transferred
to her children or held in trust for them.7 ' In the absence of
children, the dowry must revert to the woman's parents. 7'
To implement and enforce the offense of failure to transfer
the dowry to the bride, section 6(3A) requires the court to
order the recipient of the dowry to make the transfer to the
woman, or to her heirs, parents or children if she is dead.'
If the offender fails to comply with the order, section 6(3A)
requires the court to order the offender to pay to the woman or
to her heirs an amount equal to the value of the dowry.'
Section 6, in creating the offense of the failure to transfer
dowry, addresses the social reality that dowry is widely prac-
ticed despite the prohibition of dowry and the demand for
dowry under sections 3 and 4 of the Act, respectively. The
Joint Committee of the Parliament stated that one of the goals
of section 6 is "to ensure that the dowry, which is essentially
for the benefit of the girl, is not misappropriated by the person
who is holding it for the time being .... , Consequently,
section 6 attempts to convert dowry into stridhan by requiring
167. Id. § 6(l)(a)-(c) (as amended 1984).
168. See id. § 6(2) (as amended 1984 and 1986).
169. See id. § 6(3).
170. Id. § 6(3)(b) (as amended 1986).
171. See id. § 6(3)(a) (as amended 1986).
172. Id. § 6(3A) (as amended 1984 and 1986).
173. Id.
174. Dowry Report, supra note 136, § 3.22, reprinted in D1WAN & DIWAN, supra
note 118, at 465.
670 [Vol. XXI:3
BRIDE BURNING IN INDIA
the husband and in-laws to transfer the extorted wealth to the
woman.
Converting dowry into strfdhan is desirable as a short-
term solution to providing women with economic security in a
patriarchal society, at least until they are provided with great-
er educational and career opportunities. Since most women do
not earn an independent income, they rely on the cash and
equity given to them by their parents, husband, or in-laws for
economic security. The amount of wealth women possess gives
them a certain degree of social and economic status and inde-
pendence in the family structure. In this context, abolishing
gift-giving altogether would economically harm women. Howev-
er, ensuring that women have control over the use and dispos-
al of property that passes to their husbands and in-laws in
dowry transactions would give women some economic security.
Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act attempts to do just this,
by providing for the transfer of dowry to the woman where it is
illegally given.
Providing for the effective transfer of dowry to the woman
would make a dramatic difference in giving economic security
to women. First, gifts given by the bride's family for the
woman's welfare and protection rarely go to her. 5 The bride
often does not even have control over her own clothing or orna-
ments because gifts are often handed directly to the husband
and his family. Second, the husband and in-laws can compel
the bride's family to give gifts to them directly rather than to
the bride because they have greater bargaining power in the
marriage transaction.1" They can use threats of desertion,
divorce, or violence in order to force compliance by the bride's
family. Against these socio-cultural pressures that direct gift-
giving to the husband and in-laws, section 6(3A) specifically
provides a potentially strong implementation and enforcement
mechanism. It requires the court to order the transfer of the
dowry or its monetary equivalent to the bride or her heirs even
after the conviction of the husband and in-laws for the failure
to transfer dowry under section 6."' Consequently, it allows
for the usual criminal remedy of imprisonment or a fine or
175. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
176. See supra text accompanying note 45.
177. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 6(3A), 6 INDIA CODE 40F (1961) (as
amended 1984 and 1986).
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both, and additionally mandates the return of the woman's
dowry to her without her having to institute a separate action
for a civil remedy.
Furthermore, section 6(3) complements section 6(3A) by
preventing the husband and the in-laws from becoming unjust-
ly enriched by the woman's dowry in the event of her death. It
requires the woman's dowry to be passed upon her death to
her children, and in their absence, to her parents rather than
to her husband. Thus, section 6(3) attempts to transfer wealth
back to the family from which the dowry was forcefully extract-
ed; in doing so, it induces the husband and in-laws to take into
account the possible financial loss that they may incur if they
actively participate in the woman's murder or in her suicide.
Therefore, the intended effect of section 6 is to protect the
woman by raising her financial status in the family structure
of her in-laws' home.
Despite the potentially strong enforcement mechanisms in
sections 6(3A) and 6(3), the three-month limit in section 6(1)
within which dowry has to be transferred effectively weakens
the complaints of many women, particularly those who seek
the transfer of dowry months or even years later. The assump-
tion behind the three-month limit is that the husband and in-
laws will comply with this requirement in order to avoid crimi-
nal liability, and that the woman and her natal family will
bring a criminal complaint for non-compliance. Consequently, a
woman's claim against her husband or in-laws for the failure
to transfer dowry appears to be less credible when it is made
months or even years after the marriage. Instead, it appears to
be a vengeful act to take back voluntary presents from the
husband and in-laws because the marriage failed.
Hence, the three-month limit effectively disregards the
social reality in which the husband and his family enjoy a
greater bargaining position in the continuation of the marriage
with their credible threats of abuse, desertion, or murder of the
woman. The woman and her family are likely to be reluctant
to bring a criminal action against the husband and in-laws for
the failure to transfer dowry soon after marriage. Within the
first few months of the marriage, the bride is reasonably con-
cerned more about adjusting to her new family and new home
than about quarreling over her property rights.
Accordingly, section 6(3) should be amended to reflect the
reality that women may seek the transfer of dowry once they
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settle into the marriage or upon the breakdown of the mar-
riage. It should not require a time limit in which the dowry
has to be transferred. Instead, it should create incentives for
the husband and in-laws to transfer the dowry to the bride as
soon as possible, preferably within the stipulated three-month
limit. This can be done by imposing stricter penalties for the
failure to transfer dowry in proportion to the time that has
elapsed since the time of marriage or the giving of dowry.
The current punishment provision is inadequate as a de-
terrent for several reasons. First, the low imprisonment term
of six months to two years for failing to transfer dowry is a
nominal price to pay for the huge amount of wealth that the
dowry brings into the bridegroom's family. Second, the perpe-
trators may be able to escape imprisonment altogether because
the court has the discretion to punish the perpetrators with a
fine instead of imprisonment. Finally, a fine ranging anywhere
from five thousand to ten thousand rupees is insufficient as a
deterrent in cases where the wealth transferred to the
bridegroom's family exceeds this level. This is a particular
concern because the dowry practice is most prevalent among
educated and upper-middle-class families who demand exorbi-
tant amounts of cash and goods from the bride's family.
Moreover, for the sake of social status or prestige, the
bride's family is likely to find any means possible to meet the
demands of the husband and in-laws. Furthermore, most of
this wealth is likely to be transferred to the bridegroom's fami-
ly secretly and with "black money."'78 Consequently, the
woman and her family may have a difficult time proving the
amount and form of wealth that was given to the bridegroom's
family as dowry.
Thus, even if the woman wins a case against her husband
and in-laws for the failure to transfer dowry, she may actually
receive only a small proportion of the dowry that was given to
them, resulting in their unjust enrichment. Therefore, the
178. Black money is money which is not shown as income and is not taxed.
See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 197 (3d ed.
1992). Since business persons and other upper middle class persons hold large
sums of money in black, they are likely to spend this money lavishly on consumer
goods and other luxury items, marriage ceremonies, and the like. Since black mon-
ey is unrecorded, it poses special problems in the calculation of the amount of
dowry that is given and received over the course of the marriage. See KUMARI,
supra note 5, at 75.
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penalties under section 6 need to be strengthened to take into
account that a large amount of wealth is secretly transferred to
the bridegroom's family.
5. The Burden of Proof in the Offenses under the Dowry
Prohibition Act
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986 intro-
duced section 8A, which states:
Where any person is prosecuted for taking or abetting the
taking of any dowry under [section] 3, or the demanding of
dowry under [section] 4, the burden of proving that he had
not committed an offence under those sections shall be on
hin.
1 7 9
Essentially, this provision creates a presumption that the hus-
band and in-laws committed the offense of the taking of dowry,
the abetting of the taking of dowry, or the demand for dowry
when they are charged for those crimes. The burden of proof
shifts to the husband and in-laws to show that they have not
committed those crimes.
This provision is an aggressive move towards condemning
the practice of taking dowry and the demand for dowry be-
cause it directly addresses the difficulty of proof that women
and their families encounter in their claims. These difficulties
in proof arise as a result of the thin distinction between volun-
tary presents given to the bridegroom's family and gifts extort-
ed by them in the form of dowry. This distinction is partly
qualitative because dowry introduces the element of coercion.
It is also partly quantitative because the amount of dowry
demanded or given is likely to be exorbitant and excessive rela-
tive to the financial status of the giver.
The distinction between whether the gifts are voluntary or
coerced often depends on the private transactions agreed to by
the families of both parties to the marriage, and upon the
treatment of the woman in her new home after marriage.8 '
This distinction is very difficult to make because these events
179. Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 8A, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.)
189-90.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (voluntary gift-giving), 10-14
(forced gift-giving).
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usually occur in the privacy of the home of the husband and
in-laws and there are rarely any disinterested witnesses to the
transaction.
Even the quantitative element of dowry is very difficult to
prove because most of the wealth transferred to the
bridegroom's family is unrecorded and financed with black
money. Here again, the only witnesses to the secret transac-
tions are the two families themselves.
The section 8A presumption eases the burden on the
woman's family to produce evidence to which the husband's
family has greater access. Underlying this presumption is an
acknowledgement that dowry givers are the victims, and conse-
quently, less culpable for engaging in the practice.
Nevertheless, this provision should be further strength-
ened to protect women's property rights more directly by ex-
tending its reach to the section 6 offense of the failure to trans-
fer dowry. The failure to transfer dowry is also an offense
where the woman faces the obstacle of difficulty of proof for
essentially the same reasons. Further, the consequences for the
woman would be more substantial because it would facilitate a
criminal remedy that entitles the woman to the rightful return
of property that her family gave for her alleged well-being.
6. The Dowry Death Offense
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986 intro-
duced section 304B into the Indian Penal Code, which defines
and punishes perpetrators for the crime of dowry death:
Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in con-
nection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be
called "dowry death, and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death. 8'
If all the above conditions are present, then there is a pre-
sumption that the accused has committed the crime of dowry
181. Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 10, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.)
190 (amending INDIA PEN. CODE § 304B).
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death; the operative part of section 113B of the Indian Evi-
dence Act inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act
of 1986 states that the "Court shall presume that such person
had caused the dowry death."'82 If the individual is unable to
meet the burden of proof that he or she did not commit the
dowry death offense, that individual is convicted and subject to
"imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 8 '
The most important aspect of section 304B is section 113B
of the Evidence Act because the accused is presumed to have
committed the dowry death, regardless of whether the accused
has any direct connection with it.' The prosecution need on-
ly provide direct evidence of cruelty and harassment for or in
connection with the demand for dowry in order for the pre-
sumption to apply."
This presumption is especially critical because the death
normally occurs in the in-laws' home and the woman is fre-
quently burned to death. By burning the woman to death, the
husband and in-laws usually destroy the evidence connecting
them to the crime. 8 ' Moreover, they can easily manipulate
the evidence in their favor by claiming that the woman died as
a result of a kitchen accident. Consequently, shifting the bur-
den to the husband and in-laws to prove that they did not
murder the woman or assist in her suicide strengthens the
prosecution for dowry death offenses.
Nevertheless, section 304B is problematic because before
any presumption of dowry death can be made, the prosecution
has to overcome the hurdle of establishing that the husband
and in-laws subjected the woman to cruelty. Cruelty to a mar-
ried woman means:
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
182. Id. § 12, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 191 (amending Indian Evidence Act, No. 1,
§ 113B, 4 INDIA CODE 11 (1872)).
183. Id. § 10, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 190 (amending INDIA PEN. CODE
§ 301B(2)).
184. See Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 110, at 86.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable secu-
rity or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand. 187
The definition of cruelty is very broad and includes both physi-
cal and mental cruelty. It recognizes that the physical and the
emotional abuse of the woman is intimately related to the
dowry demands of the husband and in-laws.
Despite this expansive definition of cruelty, the prosecu-
tion bears a heavy burden to prove that the husband and in-
laws subjected the woman to cruelty before death. Cruelty
takes subtle forms, and generally the only witnesses to the
abuse are the husband and in-laws.'88 The husband and in-
laws have control over the evidence and can easily manipulate
it in their favor. Consequently, the prosecution encounters
similar problems in procuring physical evidence to establish
cruelty as it does in establishing murder or assisted suicide.
Another problem with section 304B is that charges for the
dowry death offense can be brought against the husband and
in-laws only where the woman died under unnatural circum-
stances "within seven years of her marriage."'89 The seven-
year limitation enables offenders to escape penalty under the
dowry death provision by postponing the woman's murder until
the limitation has expired. For instance, on March 8, 1995,
Babulal burned his twenty-two year old wife Vimala Devi to
death after having waited for seven years to realize his
plan. 9 ' He had told Vimala Devi that he would kill her when
the seven years were up.'' Nevertheless, the police refused
187. INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A, as amended by Criminal Law (Second Amend-
ment) Act of 1983, No. 46, § .2, 1984 A.I.R. 71 (Nag.) 68. Although no explanation
for cruelty is given under § 304B, the Supreme Court of India has held that "cru-
elty" under § 304B has the same meaning as "cruelty" under INDIA PEN. CODE
§ 498A, under which cruelty, by itself, is a punishable offense. See Shanti v. State
of Haryana, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 271; Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 110, at 84.
188. See DIWAN & DIWAN, supra note 118, at 119 (noting the difficulty in prov-
ing events which take place "within the four walls of the home"); Sandanshiv &
Mathew, supra note 110, at 80.
189. INDIA PEN. CODE § 304B(1), as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amend-
ment) Act, No. 43, § 10, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 190.
190. See Police Refuse to Register Dowry Death Case Against Husband, INDIAN
EXPRESS (Del.), Mar. 13, 1995, Metro sec., at 2 thereinafter Police Refuse].
191. See id.
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to register a case against him because the seven-year limita-
tion had expired.'92
Vimala Devi's murder calls for a reassessment of the sev-
en-year limitation. The assumption behind the seven-year
limitation is that it is "believed to be ample time to manage
and ascertain a potentially abusive relationship. Dowry abuse
is thought to be lessened with the arrival of children and time
for the marriage to stabilize."'93 However, this assumption
disregards the social reality that some families will go to great
lengths to secure more dowry.94 Babulal was willing to sus-
tain a marriage and terrorize his wife for seven years in order
to satisfy his greed for more money.'95 The seven-year limita-
tion did not protect Vimala Devi and it will not protect other
women, because "[i]t is cheaper for a man to kill his spouse
and obtain a new one with another dowry than [it is] to divorce
his wife and pay her maintenance."'96 For this reason, section
304B should be amended to eliminate the seven-year limita-
tion.
Furthermore, the presumption of dowry death should be
applied to any death that "occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances."'97 In other words, if a woman is found
burned to death under suspicious circumstances in the privacy
of her husband's or in-laws' home, the presumption should be
that the husband and the in-laws murdered her or caused her
to commit suicide. The current burden on the prosecution to
prove that the husband and in-laws subjected the woman to
cruelty before the woman's death should be removed. It is an
onerous requirement and poses a practical obstacle to the con-
viction of offenders.
7. Cognizance of Offenses
Section 7(1)(b) of the current Dowry Prohibition Act states:
[N]o court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act
192. See id.
193. Ritu Baneijee, Bride-Burning and the Law: Vimala Devi's Tragedy, in
DOWRY CONFERENCE SOUVENIR, supra note 12, at 4-1, 4-4.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. INDIA PEN. CODE § 304B(1), as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amend-
ment) Act, No. 43, § 10, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 190.
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except upon-
(i) its own knowledge or a police report of the facts
which constitute such offence, or
(ii) a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or
a parent or other relative of such person, or by.any recognized
welfare institution or organisation.'98
The strength of this provision lies in the court's competence to
hear a case that comes to it based on a complaint made to the
court or to the police by women's organizations that are knowl-
edgeable about the victim's plight.
The role of women's organizations in bringing to the
court's attention offenses committed in relation to the taking of
or demand for dowry is especially critical to the enforcement of
the Act, because women's organizations work directly with
victims. Women's organizations provide women with counsel-
ing, legal advice, and placement in shelters, '99 and therefore
the organizations are likely to be most knowledgeable when
violations of the Act occur.
Furthermore, giving women's organizations the authority
to make complaints on behalf of victims enables the court to
hear cases that otherwise would not come before it because
women and their parents are unlikely to report violations of
the Act out of social pressures and fear. 00 First, they are
generally interested in preserving the marriage, and not in
punishing offenders despite excessive and unlawful demands
for dowry.20' Second, the woman and her parents view dowry
as a necessary price to pay for a married life, which they
equate with the woman's happiness. '2 Once the woman gets
married, the decision to complain against dowry becomes much
more difficult since compliance with the demand controls the
198. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 23, § 7(1)(b)(i)-(ii), 6 INDIA CODE 40F (1961),
as amended by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 6 (1984) (emphasis
added).
199. See Police Refuse, supra note 190, at 2; KUMARI, supra note 5, at 86. See
generally D.N. Sandanshiv, Bride Burning: Perspective of Interveners, in KAI'S
YUG, supra note 8, at 94, 94-104.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85; see also KUMARI, supra note 5,
at 86-87 (noting the "significant role" that women's organizations play in the anti-
dowry movement, and their ability to change prevailing social norms).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85; Kumari, supra note 95, at 119.
202. See KUMARI, supra note 5, at 15.
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maintenance of the marriage."' As a result, the woman or
her relatives file a complaint "only when harassment for dowry
increases beyond endurance."" 4
Despite the legal authority of women's organizations to
make complaints about violations under the Dowry Prohibition
Act, the major weakness to the effectiveness of this provision is
the discretion given to courts to hear dowry cases. Since judges
vary in the sensitivity and the seriousness with which they
regard the dowry problem, they may dismiss cases with or
without serious investigation, depending on their dispositions
and views. Therefore, section 7 should be amended to reduce
the discretion of judges in taking cognizance of offenses under
the Act and to mandate serious investigation of all dowry com-
plaints. Perhaps, separate family courts should be established
to handle all dowry cases so that they can be resolved justly,
efficiently, and expeditiously.
8. Discipline for Offenses Under the Act
Section 8 of the Dowry Prohibition Act2 5 makes all of-
fenses non-bailable.. and non-compoundable.0 7 This sec-
203. See Kumari, supra note 95, at 120.
204. Id. at 119.
205. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 8, 6 INDIA CODE 40G (1961), as amended
by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 63, § 7 (1984) and Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, No. 43, § 7, 1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 189.
206. Id. § 8(2) (as amended 1986). A non-bailable offense is one that prohibits
a convicted individual from posting bail as a matter of right. The defendant must
petition the court for bail, and give reasons why bail is appropriate in his case.
For instance, a defendant could argue that his release on bail would not in any
way contaminate evidence. Generally, the court has exercised great discretion in
granting bail and has awarded it in many cases. See Sandanshiv & Mathew, su-
pra note 110, at 90-91. In Amarnath Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1990
Crim. L.J. 2163 (India), the High Court issued an order granting bail "on the
ground that the victim's diary contained a letter written by her stating that no-
body was to be blamed for her suicide." Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 110, at
90. The High Court rationalized the decision by noting that nothing in the record
indicated that the defendants would misuse the liberty granted to them. See id.
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court decision, but in doing so noted that
"sentimentalism has no place in the judicial process." Id. at 90-91. Despite the
Supreme Court's stance in exercising caution in the grant of bail, both the high
courts and courts of sessions continue to grant bail in dowry death cases. See id.
at 90.
207. Under Indian law, a non-compoundable offense is one that does not allow
the parties to compromise once the case goes to court. See Letter from Subhadra
Chaturvedi, Advocate, Supreme Court and High Courts, New Delhi, to author (Dec.
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tion is desirable because convicted offenders are not entitled to
bail as a matter of right, and they must petition the court in
order to be considered for bail. Unfortunately, this provision
has not been effective in deterring the grant of bail in dowry
death cases because the Sessions Courts and the High Courts
continually grant bail in cases of domestic violence and dowry
deaths despite the Supreme Court's repeated pleas of cau-
tion.20
8
Since courts are liberal in granting bail to offenders, of-
fenders are free to tamper with and hamper investigations,
and to influence witnesses.29 For this provision to be more
effective as a deterrent to dowry crimes and as a method of
ensuring unhampered investigation, courts will have to take
dowry crimes more seriously and to restrict bail to exceptional
cases.
Currently, the liberal grant of bail by courts only serves as
an incentive for the husbands and in-laws to commit dowry
crimes and then to cover up the evidence. Furthermore, the
non-compoundability of offenses under the Act does not deter
families from taking dowry, demanding dowry, or killing for
dowry. Preventing parties from compromising once the case
goes to court does not necessarily allow the conclusion that
husbands and in-laws will think twice before committing the
crime for fear of a long-drawn-out battle in court. Husbands
and in-laws can easily avoid this provision by compromising
with the woman's family before the case goes to court. Accord-
ing to Public Prosecutor Renuka: "Seventy per cent of dowry
death cases are ending in acquittals due to compromises be-
tween the in-laws and the victim's parents. Sometimes, for as
small a sum as 5,000 Rupees, the dowry victim's parents are
withdrawing the complaint. And such compromises are increas-
ing alarmingly."21 Consequently, the penal provisions under
the Act are not a deterrent to dowry crimes because the hus-
band and in-laws know that they can escape penalty by paying
off the victim's parents with a nominal sum of money.
7, 1996) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
208. See Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 110, at 90. Courts of Sessions are
trial courts; high courts are the intermediate appellate courts. The Supreme Court
is the highest court and its determination is final.
209. See Hathi, supra note 87, at 8.
210. Id.
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In this context, parents are playing an active role in per-
petuating dowry crimes against their daughters. Therefore, to
protect women and to ensure that offenders are punished for
their crimes, section 8 of the Act should be amended to take
away the discretion of the woman's parents and relatives to
withdraw the complaint.
B. Complementary Provisions in the Indian Penal Code
1. Protection Against Cruelty
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983 in-
serted section 498A into the Indian Penal Code, which
criminalizes physical and emotional abuse by the husband or
his relatives, and specifically characterizes the wife's harass-
ment for the unlawful demand for dowry as an offense of cruel-
ty.21' The legislature introduced this section in response to
the "increasing number of dowry deaths."" It recognized
that cruelty by the husband and his relatives "culminate[s] in
suicide by, or murder of, the hapless woman concerned,"
2 13
and that these cases "constitute only a small fraction of the
cases involving such cruelty."2 14 Section 498A defines the of-
fense of cruelty as follows:
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable secu-
rity or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.215
Cruelty is punishable with a term of imprisonment which may
211. INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A, as amended by Criminal Law (Second Amend-
ment) Act of 1983, No. 46, § 2, 1984 A.I.R. 71 (Nag.) 68.
212. R. DAYAL, LAW RELATING TO DOWRY 1157 (1995) (citing legislative history
of the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983, No. 46, 1984 A.I.R. 71
(Nag.) 68).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A(a)-(b), as amended by Criminal Law (Second
Amendment) Act of 1983, No. 46, § 2, 1984 A.I.R. 71 (Nag.) 68.
682 [Vol. XXII:3
BRIDE BURNING IN INDIA
extend to three years and a fine.216
The strength of section 498A is that it specifically deals
with the situation where the husband and in-laws demand
dowry from the woman after the marriage and where the dow-
ry falls short of the expectations of the husband and in-laws.
Section 498A links this unlawful demand with the social reali-
ty of the harassment that many women face when the dowry
falls short of the demand or expectation. This provision can be
used for criminal redress by women against their husbands or
in-laws for depriving them of food and clothing, for locking
them up in dingy rooms, or for beating them.
Furthermore, section 498A makes the husband and in-
laws liable for cruelty any time after the marriage. There is no
requirement that the harassment occur within seven years of
marriage like the one found in the dowry death offense created
by the Dowry Prohibition Act.1 This is beneficial for women
because they may tolerate years of abuse before they decide to
leave the violent home.
Section 498A also recognizes that the level of abuse may
be so intense that it may endanger the woman's life or drive
her to suicide. Nevertheless, the level of punishment this sec-
tion imposes on the offender does not reflect that greater levels
of abuse should warrant stricter penalties. Therefore, section
498A should be amended to remove the three-year maximum
imprisonment term and to allow for stricter penalties that
coincide with the level of abuse.
Section 498A presents the same problems of burden and
proof as does section 304B. This problem of evidence and proof
should be addressed by creating a presumption of cruelty
whenever any form of wealth is transferred from the woman's
family to the husband and in-laws. The burden-of proof would
then be on those who have control over the evidence-the hus-
band and in-laws-to prove that they did not physically or
emotionally harass the woman or her family for dowry.
Since cruelty in the marriage is normally intimately linked
with the demand for dowry, section 498A should also be
amended to allow the return of the woman's dowry to her or
her heirs when cruelty is established and the husband and in-
216. See id.
217. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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laws are convicted. This provision should be amended along
the lines of section 6(3A) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which
requires the court to transfer the dowry to the woman even
after the conviction of the husband and in-laws for the failure
to transfer dowry.218 Such a provision would allow for the
usual criminal remedy of imprisonment, and additionally
would mandate the return of the woman's dowry to her with-
out her having to institute a separate civil action for a civil
remedy. It would, in effect, increase the cost of punishment to
the husband and in-laws for inflicting physical and emotional
abuse on the woman.
Furthermore, such a provision would protect the woman
because she often encounters great difficulties in a civil suit for
the return of her personal property or stridhan. Kamini
Sahuami v. Puma Chandra Sahoo. 9 illustrates this difficul-
ty. In Kamini Sahuami, the husband thrashed his wife, burned
her with a hot rod, and threw her out of the house because her
parents were unable to meet additional demands for dow-
ry."' The wife instituted a civil suit for the return of the
property that she left behind in the husband's home.22" ' But
the trial court ignored the wife's averment that she gave her
ornaments to her husband; it held that the woman took her
ornaments with her when she left her husband's home.222
The trial court's judgment ignored the social reality that a
wife may allow her husband to hold on to her valuable posses-
sions since the continuation of a dowry-based marriage de-
pends on the amount of wealth that the husband and in-laws
can extract from the wife and her parents.2" The court also
did not consider the fact that a wife who was beaten could not
reasonably be expected to take or be allowed to take her gold
ornaments with her.2"
218. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 6(3A), 6 INDIA CODE 40F (1961) (as
amended 1984 and 1986).
219. 1987 AI.R. 74 (Ori.) 134.
220. Id. at 135.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 137.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 24-26.
224. On appeal in Kamini Sahuami, the High Court of Orissa did consider this
fact and overturned the trial court's ruling because it recognized the validity of
the wife's claim. See Kamini Sahuami, 1987 A.I.R. at 137-38. The High Court also
recognized that it would be impossible for the wife to prove that she was severely
beaten up and thrown out of the home in light of the fact that her in-laws were
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The wife experiences severe constraints on her ability to
prove her averments because the court must weigh her state-
ments against those of her husband. Frequently, the only wit-
nesses to her statements and the violent circumstances that
force her out of the home are the husband and in-laws. Amend-
ing section 498A to order the return of the woman's dowry to
her would remove the discretion of judges to decide whether
the level of cruelty in the marriage is sufficient to make it
impossible for the woman to exercise control over her property.
Under the scheme of a presumption of cruelty, the husband
and in-laws would have the burden of proving that the physi-
cal and emotional abuse of the woman is not linked to the
demand for dowry. If they are unable to meet this burden of
proof, the court would convict the husband for the physical and
emotional abuse as well as order the return of the woman's
dowry to her.
After such an amendment, the woman would not have to
bear the burden of proof to establish cruelty as she would have
to in the civil suit in order to prevail on her dowry claim. If
amended as suggested, section 498A could offer her protection
not only from physical and mental cruelty, but also from the
extortion and misappropriation of her personal property by the
husband and in-laws.
2. Criminal Breach of Trust
Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code states that:
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or
with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropri-
ates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly
uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction
of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be dis-
charged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which
he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully
suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of
trust."2
the only witnesses. See id. A realistic evaluation of the wife's plight enabled the
High Court to accept the wife's averment that her husband held her gold orna-
ments. Consequently, the court ordered the husband to return her gold ornaments
or their monetary equivalent. See id.
225. INDIA PEN. CODE § 405.
19971 685
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Section 406 provides for punishment of imprisonment of up to
three years, a fine, or both for any person who commits crimi-
nal breach of trust.226
The Supreme Court precedents on the criminal breach of
trust indicate that in order to establish "entrustment of domin-
ion" over property to an accused person, it must be shown that
the person's dominion over the property was the result of en-
trustment.227 The requirements of entrustment are: (a) that
the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that
property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner;
and (b) the person handing over the property must have confi-
dence in the person taking the property to create a fiduciary
relationship between them."8 Moreover, the accused must
hold the property for the benefit of its owner.229
Nevertheless, section 405 does not require the creation of
trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust, such as a
special agreement between the parties." It contemplates
that a relationship of trust is created by the transfer of the
owner's property to a third party for the purpose of retaining it
until a certain contingency arises or disposing it on the hap-
pening of a certain eventY
Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term "trust"
creatively and broadly, in order to give a criminal remedy to
dowry victims against their husbands and in-laws for misap-
propriating their personal property.12 In Pratibha Rani v.
Suraj Kumar, the Supreme Court approved the Calcutta High
Court's holding that a woman does not lose ownership of her
ornaments in handing them over to her husband and in-laws;
but rather, she trusts them to return her property to her after
using it for the purpose for which she handed it over.233
Despite the Supreme Court's extension of trust to include
the relationship of husband and wife, many lower courts are
226. Id. § 406.
227. See Velji Raghavji v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1433, 1435.
228. See Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 628, 640 (citing State
of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, (1968) 2 S.C.R. 408).
229. See Narayan Ittiravi v. State of Tra.-Co., A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 478, 484.
230. See Harihar Prasad v. Tulsi Das Mundhra, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 81, 82 (citing
Jaswantrai Manilal v. State of Bombay, (1956) S.C.R. 483).
231. See id.
232. See Pratibha Rani, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. at 640 (citing Sushil Kumar Gupta v.
Joy Shanker Bhattacharjee A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1543).
233. See id. (citing Basudeb Patra v. Kanai Lal Haldar, A.I.R. 1949 (Cal.) 207).
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reluctant to find a husband guilty under section 405. In the
Supreme Court opinion of Pratibha Rani, Justice Ali Fazl stat-
ed: "[Elven when clear and specific allegations are made in the
complaint that [stridhan] properties were entrusted to the
husband, [lower courts] refuse to believe these hard facts and
brush them aside on the ground[s] that they are vague." 4
In Pratibha Rani, Pratibha Ran's husband threw her out
of the house because her parents failed to meet the additional
dowry demands of the husband and in-laws."' They also re-
fused to return her stridhan or personal property, including
her clothes and jewelry." The High Court concluded that the
husband and her in-laws did not violate section 405 because
Pratibha Rani did not entrust her stridhan to her husband.m
The High Court's conclusion rested on the premise that
strEdhan of the wife is joint property, and consequently that
spouses do not stand in formal relationship to one another in
such a way that each possesses exclusive property and entrusts
the other with that property or with dominion over that prop-
erty."s Marriage, the High Court reasoned, is a union be-
tween two people and implies joint ownership over even mov-
able properties exclusively owned by each.239
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments
because the High Court built its conclusion on the incorrect
premise that strrdhan is joint property rather than the
woman's absolute property." ° The husband's or in-laws' pos-
session of the stridhan does not in and of itself indicate that
the woman owns it with them jointly or that she transferred
234. Id. at 643.
235. Id. at 630, 632.
236. See id. at 630.
237. See id. at 632, 634.
238. See id. at 634.
239. See id.
240. See id. The Supreme Court chided the High Court in no uncertain terms,
and was shocked that the lower court could:
permit the husband to cast his covetous eyes on the absolute and person-
al property of his wife merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby
reducing the custody to a legal farce.. . . [I]t seems to us that even if
the personal property of the wife is jointly kept, it would be deemed to
be expressly or impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he
dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the same, he is certainly
guilty of criminal breach of trust, and there can be no escape from this
legal consequence.
Id. at 634-35.
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her rights of ownership to them.2" The Court stated that:
[So far as the jewellery and clothes, blouses, nighties and
gowns are concerned they could be used only by the wife and
were her stridhan. By no stretch of imagination could it be
said that the ornaments and sarees and other articles men-
tioned above could also be used by the husband. If, therefore,
despite demands these articles were refused to be returned to
the wife by the husband and his parents, it amounted to an
offence of criminal breach of trust.A2
The Court reasoned that the realities of married life in India
indicate that the wife entrusts her husband and her in-laws
with her personal property.2" A newly married woman is un-
likely to "keep her personal property or belongings like
jewellery, clothing, etc., under her own lock and key, thus
showing a spirit of distrust to the husband at the very be-
hest."'
Pratibha Rani reflects the aggressive stand that the Su-
preme Court has taken to ensure that women have a criminal
remedy in addition to a civil remedy for the misappropriation
of their personal property by their husband and in-laws. Un-
derlying the Pratibha Rani decision is the recognition that
most of the dowry wealth is handed directly to the husband
and in-laws and that women have little or no access to it. The
Court displays an understanding of dowry as property given by
the woman's parents to the husband and in-laws for the bene-
fit of the bride, regardless of whether in actual practice the
woman possesses it. Even clothes and jewelry that, in ancient
times, were given directly to the bride in the form of stridhan,
are more likely today to be given to the husband and in-laws.
Even if they are given directly to the woman, the husband and
in-laws are more likely than not to take her clothes and jewel-
ry from her.
This assumption that the Court makes is critical to its
241. See id.
242. Id. at 633. The Court left open in its list of articles the status of furni-
ture and utensils, which could possibly be characterized as joint property as op-
posed to the woman's str-dhan-her absolute property. The Court reasoned that an
argument could be made that the husband and wife held these items in joint
possession since they were meant for the joint use of husband and wife. See id.
243. See id. at 633, 635.
244. Id. at 634.
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conclusion that the husband misappropriated the woman's
jewelry and clothes in criminal breach of trust. Since dowry is
given by the woman's parents for her benefit, the husband and
in-laws do not rightfully own it. If they do not own this proper-
ty, then they can only hold it in trust for the bride. Thus, the
conclusion follows that any time the husband and in-laws use
or dispose the property without the woman's permission or
refuse to return it to her upon her request, they have misap-
propriated her property.
This interpretation of criminal breach of trust in the con-
text of the marital relationship is in line with the use of the
term "trust" in section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.245 Sec-
tion 6 of the Act states that: "Where any dowry is received by
any person other than the woman in connection with whose
marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the wom-
an... and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the
benefit of the woman.""6
The use of the term "trust" here indicates that the legisla-
ture understood the meaning of "trust" to encompass the rela-
tionship between the husband or in-laws and the wife. Any
dowry that passes to the husband or in-laws is the woman's
property and can only be held in trust until it is transferred to
the woman.
If this definition of "trust" is imported into section 405,
then it invites the conclusion that the husband and in-laws
violate this trust when they refuse the woman access to prop-
erty that was given for her benefit. This conclusion is consis-
tent with the legislative intent of the Parliament to protect the
woman's control over her property, when it created the offense
of the failure to transfer dowry under the Dowry Prohibition
Act." v Therefore, the Supreme Court furthered the legislative
intent of Parliament in construing the general provisions of
sections 405 and 406 to afford a criminal remedy to dowry
victims for the misappropriation of their property by their
husbands or in-laws.
Nevertheless, lower courts remain an obstacle to dowry
victims who seek a criminal remedy under section 405. The
245. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67, 172-74.
246. Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28, § 6(1), 6 INDIA CODE 40F (1961).
247. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.
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legislature should respond to the judicial reluctance at the
lower levels by clarifying that section 405 extends to women
who seek a criminal remedy for the misappropriation of their
personal property by their husbands and in-laws.
C. The Role of Law Enforcement Agencies in Hampering the
Effectiveness of Dowry and Dowry Violence Legislation
Law enforcement agencies disregard the complaints of
many dowry victims, their families, and women's organizations
about the unlawful demands for dowry by husbands and in-
laws and dowry-related violence and death."8 They frequent-
ly fail to register offenses and carelessly or dishonestly inves-
tigate and prosecute cases. As a result, in many cases, the
guilty go free.
The Supreme Court decision of Lichhamadevi v. State of
Rajasthan"s is one such case. In Lichhamadevi, a bride's
brother-in-law escaped punishment for burning the young
bride to death because the police failed to prosecute him, de-
spite the mother-in-law's statement that the brother-in-law
might have burned the bride and despite the neighbors' claims
that they saw the brother-in-law behind the kitchen and run-
ning down the stairs while the bride was in flames inside.5 '
In the same case, the police also failed to charge the hus-
band for abetting in the murder even though there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the charge."' The husband silently
watched his wife as she was aflame, made no effort to take her
to the hospital, and took no action to secure blood for her.25"
The police's failure to take initial action against the brother-in-
law and husband allowed two of the three participants in the
dowry murder to go free; only the mother-in-law was convict-
ed.
The police have also been guilty of delaying and hindering
justice by manipulating crucial evidence in the case against
perpetrators. Sudha Goel's case 4 illustrates the difficulty
248. See KUIARI, supra note 5, at 81-85; Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at
49-50.
249. A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1785.
250. Id. at 1787.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1788.
254. State (Delhi Admin.) v. Kumar, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 250; see Jethmalani &
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that courts face in resolving contradictions in the evidence
when the police tamper with a dying declaration,255 often the
most crucial evidence leading to the conviction of the perpetra-
tor. Sudha's oral dying declaration to the neighbor-witnesses
who saw her in flames when she was brought out of the house
differed from the written, unsigned version recorded by the
Investigation Officer at the hospital." 6 The oral declaration
reflected that the mother-in-law burned the wife, while the
written version portrayed the incident as an accident. '7
Since written declarations are normally more reliable than oral
declarations by virtue of their form, inconsistency in the oral
and written declarations is problematic for courts, as it was in
this case. The trial court and the high court reached different
conclusions, depending on the weight they each attributed to
the oral and written declarations. 8
In addition to revealing dishonest investigations by police,
the Sudha Goel case also shows how police collusion can delay
justice even after the Supreme Court's conviction of the hus-
band. The police did not promptly arrest the husband upon
conviction as proper procedure required.259 When the police
finally arrested the husband to complete a term for life, the
husband (during his time out on bail) had married a second
Dey, supra note 10, at 51-60 (discussing Kumar). Twenty-year-old Sudha Goel was
subjected to ill-treatment by her husband, his mother, and his brother within the
first month of marriage for bringing in insufficient dowry. See Jethnalani & Dey,
supra note 10, at 52. She was pregnant, and a week before her delivery she was
murdered. See id.
255. Under Indian law, a dying declaration is a statement made by a person
who is under a sense of impending death and who, after making the statement,
dies. See Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 110, at 87. Such a statement is an
exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible, unless such
evidence is tested by cross-examination. See id. The rationale for the dying decla-
ration exception to the hearsay rule is that a person on the verge of death is
most unlikely to make an untrue statement. See id.
256. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 53-55.
257. See id.
258. See Kumar, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. at 253-254. The trial court accepted the oral
declaration and convicted the husband. See id. at 253. The high court reversed the
conviction, as it accepted the written declaration of the investigating officer. See
id. at 258. On appeal, the Supreme Court convicted the husband. See id. at 266.
It accepted Sudha Goel's oral declaration on the ground that it was corroborated
by the reliable testimony of neighbors who witnessed the statement. See id. at
259.
259. See Jethmalani & Dey, supra note 10, at 60.
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time and had two children as well.260
Since police misconduct is pervasive at all stages, from the
filing of the complaint to investigation of the case and acquisi-
tion of evidence to arrest of the offender, the law should take a
heavy-handed approach against law enforcement agencies. It
should classify such a crime as an obstruction of justice and
impose strict penalties. Specifically, the role of the police in the
manipulation of evidence in collusion with the husband's fami-
ly or the doctor should be condemned as a crime for the sup-
pression of evidence. With strict penalties in place, law en-
forcement agents would take dowry cases more seriously and
have greater incentives to follow proper procedure. With more
exigent enforcement, bribes by husbands and their families
may look less attractive. Further, dowry and dowry violence
legislation could be more effectively enforced.
V. CONCLUSION
India must strengthen its dowry and dowry violence legis-
lation to take into account the social acceptance of dowry at all
levels of society, including the acceptance by the woman's par-
ents, the woman herself, the husband and his family, law en-
forcement agents, and lower courts. Dowry and dowry violence
are as much an outgrowth of consumer greed and a decline in
moral values as they are a reflection of a patriarchal society
that discourages the education and economic self-sufficiency of
women. Within this context, the bridegroom's family has the
superior position in the marriage transaction and can structure
it in ways to avoid criminal penalties under the legislation. In
addition, it has the social support of law enforcement agents
who are reluctant to enforce violations of dowry and dowry
violence provisions. The bridegroom's family also has the social
support of lower courts that are reluctant to give a woman
property rights over the dowry, and to acknowledge the role of
the violence of husbands and in-laws in denying these rights to
her.
The legislation must be strengthened to increase the cost
to the husband and in-laws of taking dowry and abusing the
woman. It should ensure that the woman has property rights
over the wealth that passes from her parents to the
260. See id.
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bridegroom's family. Stricter penalties need to be in force to
punish the misappropriation of property by the husband and
in-laws, and any violence perpetrated with the intent to do so.
Moreover, a presumption of cruelty should be legislated in
cases where there is evidence that dowry passed to the hus-
band or in-laws. This would make it easier for women and
their families to seek a criminal remedy for abuse at all levels
of severity, not just in cases where it leads to the death of the
woman. Such legislation could protect women and essentially
could increase the cost to husbands and in-laws for engaging in
this conduct.
For legislation in these areas to be effective, however, the
police must be held accountable for their misconduct, and must
actively enforce the law. Therefore, strict penalties should be
imposed on the police for failure to follow proper procedure.
And, finally, the legislature should clear ambiguities in the
legislation in order to guide courts in interpreting and applying
the law to reach just results in dowry and dowry violence cas-
es. Fortunately, the Supreme Court's realistic and innovative
approach toward recognizing the rights of women over their
property provides a glimmer of hope.
Anshu Nangia
1997] 693

